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The paper seeks to draw a preliminary map of the relations between the human body, 
habituation, and nature, in a lineage of questioning which should be referred to as 
aristotelian in the wider sense of the term. The trail begins from aristotle’s articulations 
of Hexis, and reaches Bergson’s definition of motoric habitude, through the two 
intermediary-stops of Thomas aquinas and félix ravaisson. in all of the four “stations” 
of the trail, one finds intricate relations between habituation and nature that include 
the role that the human body plays in the process of coming-near of the two and the 
approximation between them. habituation has a task to play in the bringing of a human-
body as close as possible to its own natural reality. yet by that process habituation 
effectively covers and wraps the body with a “second” nature, a supplementary nature 
including not only actions, operations, gestures and deeds but also things that participate 
in these. finally, based on this basic structure of habituation, all the four “stops” in the 
presented conceptual genre conceive of the task of habituation as carrying a moral tenor, 
which the article seeks to portray. 
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The concept of the human body is still a difficult theme to approach 
in a philosophical manner. during the second half of the 20th century, 
continental philosophy has persistently returned to inquire into the 
problem of the reality of the body. Philosophical reflections on the body 
produced by thinkers as merleau-Ponty, michel henry, michel Foucault, 
deleuze and guattari, giorgio agamben, and more recently catharine 
malabou, graham harman and ray Brassier exemplify the centrality of the 
body as a philosophical issue in continental philosophical debates. Still, 
Jean-luc nancy was able to remark in 2000 that “all thoughts of the ‘body 
proper’, laborious efforts at re-appropriating what we used to consider, 
impatiently, as ‘objectified’ or ‘reified,’ all such thoughts about the body 
proper are […] contorted: in the end, they only expel the thing we desired”1. 
a central challenge regarding the status of the body regards its intermediate 
position between a subject-actor and a passive object, being enacted and 
moved by a subject-actor. in other words: is the body a mechanical dispositive 
to be automatized as cleverly as possible, or is it rather an intimate layer 
of inner experience, escaping the rationalizing grip of the intellect and at 
the same moment  being distinguished from the physical matter of nature? 
That is, is the body an organic part of nature, or is it somehow distinguished 
from nature qualitatively, by the fact of possessing of or being possessed by a 
human subject2? The concept of habit, contracting into itself a long tradition 
of discussion that will be portrayed in outline below, makes one of the possible 
apertures to approach this complex, ambivalent reality of the body. habit 
merits this privileged position as its functioning, similarly to that of the body 
itself, takes place between activity and passivity and between actuality and 
potentiality. most importantly, it is the position of habit as a second nature, 
or as a naturalized capacity, that places habit in the vicinity of the body itself. 
one therefore is called to pay attention to the manner in which the body 
makes itself a site for the activity of thought by processes of habituation. 
when the body is approached via the habitual framework, one is able to think 
of the human body in a manner which we recommend viewing as inherently 
moral, which is to say belonging to the domain of the human mastery of one’s 
actions. 
1  nancy, 2008: 5.
2  on this see gontier, 2001. 
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we proceed now to the more reconstructive core of this essay, which 
will revolve around issues related to the rather popular maxim “habit is 
a second nature”. The philological origins of this expression are, in fact, 
quite complex3. we suggest examining central articulations of the relation 
between habit and nature at several central stations in the conceptual 
history of habit: aristotle, aquinas, ravaisson and Bergson. we’d refer to 
nature here in the general sense of an organized matter, composed of things, 
bodies and movements. As we shall see, the core Aristotelian definitions 
are pertinent to the scholastic and to the modern formulations of habit, 
including habit’s relation to nature and to the body, so that one can detect 
here what could be called a conceptual genre. The present restoration of the 
conceptual genre of habit is done by comparing the three central historical 
moments of its longue-durée: the ancient, the medieval and the late modern. 
This will provide an introductory orientation for the question, preparing 
the groundwork for a fuller examination4.  
in aristotle, corporeal habit (ἕξις, hexis) is an evident member of the family 
of habits. in the metaphysics5 aristotle refers to bodily health as a hexis which 
is responsible for the well-balanced maintenance of living-beings. yet the 
general structure of habit in aristotle, by itself, is somewhat ambiguous. 
a basic structural ambiguity to be found in the term “hexis” is that it is 
brought by aristotle as a central example for three important categories: 
relation (πρός τι, pros ti), Quality (ποιότης, poiotes) and Possession (ἔχειν, 
echein)6. hexis is therefore conceived by aristotle as exemplifying these three 
categories: relation, quality and possession, and it is not quite decided to 
which of the three it most essentially pertains. it should be underlined that 
hexis in itself is not a category, but rather a state of affairs participating in 
these three central categories. we further learn from the Categories that as a 
(first kind of) quality, hexis should be differentiated from διάθεσις (diathesis, 
disposition). Both hexis and diathesis are qualities belonging to a substantial 
reality (οὐσία, ousia), and any hexis is also primarily a diathesis. yet, in as 
much as disposition is fleeting and unstable, hexis is a disposition which “has 
been naturalized” (πεφυσιωμένη, phepusiomene) over a period of time7”. 
hexis is then established by a process of appropriation between an acting 
3  This known maxim is not to be found in Aristotle. In Augustine, one finds the expression 
“secunda natura” together with “consuetudino”, not with “habitus.” (de musica, lib. 6, 19). augustine 
himself points to cicero as the origin of this expression.  
4  i am thankful to the gerda henkel Foundation for the support of the present project as well 
as to the community of the Thomas institute for hosting my work. 
5  aristotle, 2003: 272-273 (1022b13).  
6  aristotle, 1962b: 46-47 (6b1), 62-63 (8b27), 106-107 (15b19). 
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subject and that which she possesses. This can also happen between living 
organisms and the things that pertain to them: in the metaphysics, aristotle 
writes that between he who has a garment and the garment which is being 
had, exists a hexis8. That is to say: hexis mediates between the “owner” and 
that which is “being-had”, or property. we will return to this point later. 
in the nicomachean ethics aristotle differentiates between habit, affect 
(πάθος, pathos) and potency (δύναμις, dunamis); and out of these three state 
of the soul, only habit serve as the foundation of virtue9. Both potencies 
and affects could be viewed as participating in the natural pace of things: 
Potency exists in the thing by the latter’s very nature and could not be 
eradicated, and affects are exterior movements causing a corresponding 
movement in the body, according to causal natural laws. hexis, in its 
turn, exists between the two former states of the soul: as a process of 
naturalization, hexis is the human capability to react properly or improperly 
to the affects10, that is to say to all that which changes the human-being 
from the outside. and when a habit is established, it behaves like a potency, 
that is to say like something belonging to human nature. From this we 
induce that hexis has a complicated relation to nature: hexis is a naturalizing 
process. it goes towards nature, working to achieve a situation which is 
nature-like. And even if ethical virtues belong first and foremost to the soul, 
φύςις (phusis, nature) has an integral part to play in them. 
in the ethical context, a distinction should be made between hexis and ἔθος 
(ethos), which are both translated occasionally as “habit”.  whereas hexis 
does not necessarily belong to the ethical domain, ethos refers exclusively 
to habits pertaining to the ethical domain which is arranged by the soul. 
moreover, if hexis signifies a state of possession in a general manner, then 
the meaning of ethos goes in the more specific direction of a “custom” 
or “character”11. yet every “habit” effectuates a process which is related 
to nature and affected by it. in memory and reminiscence, aristotle writes: 
“ὥσπερ γἀρ φύσις τό ἔθος”12, “character comes after nature”. Therefore, 
it is useful to differentiate between ethos as character, which belongs to the 
ethical domain of praxis, and hexis which should be regarded as belonging to 
a proto-practical domain: hexis is certainly capable of participating in ethico-
practical processes, but by itself and in its elementary form, hexis concerns 
the fundamental, general human ability to master and dispose of his own 
8  aristotle, 2003: 272-273 (1022b9).
9  aristotle, 1962a: 86-89 (1105b20-1106a14).   
10  nickl, 2001: 19-35.
11  on the difference between hexis, ethos and hutos in aristotle, see miller, 1974. 




Virtue and a 
Genre of Things 
NATURAlIzATION: HABITS, BODIES AND THEIR SUBjECTS
adi eFal universität zu Köln
134
actions and reactions to the affects, in regard to its potencies.   
even if rigorously intermingled with natural elements and movements, 
virtue is not a natural quality. Virtue is constituted neither from nature nor 
against nature13; virtue is rather determined, stabilized and naturalized 
through a process necessitating experience and time-lapse, establishing its 
own regulations. This structure necessitates a body and an area which is 
its exterior. it necessitates the sensitivity and responsiveness of the body 
to outside influences. Finally a habit in the ethical framework necessitates 
a process of commerce between the acting-subject and its surrounding, 
determining the manner in which the acting-subject is actualized in its 
affecting environment. 
a synthesis of the above mentioned aristotelian text-locations suggests that 
the aristotelian hexis is an active relation of possession, being stabilized 
between a living actor and something that she possesses. in the ethical 
framework, that which is possessed in hexis is a capacity to react to the 
affects, in a manner which serves first and foremost the form or the soul of 
the subject-actor.  
in its medieval scholastic version, habitus, which is the latin translation 
of the greek hexis, belongs first and foremost to the soul. Yet one has to 
emphasize that Thomas aquinas did not exclude physical habitus from the 
list of habits14. instead, aquinas accepted aristotle’s determination that 
both beauty and health are habits, but he specified that they are “as habits”, 
that is to say, closer to a disposition than to habit in the full sense of the 
word. The reason aquinas provides for this differentiation is that, whereas 
habits are taken as stable and difficult to change, the body, according 
to the scholastic understanding, is viewed as a non-permanent, fleeting 
reality, always susceptible to be changed and mutated. habitus of the body is 
therefore “as” a habit, in as much as habitus of the soul is properly a habit15. 
habitus in the proper sense of the word, according to aquinas, belongs 
exclusively to the moral domain and is, as in aristotle, the foundation of 
virtue. only habit that is directed to a form (rather than to an operation), 
that is to say, to the soul (or the reality) of the subject, could have its “seat” 
in the body and therefore have the body as its subject16. Therefore habitus 
of the body, in the Thomistic framework is directed to the actualization of 
the reality (the “form”) of the actor, rather than to a specific operation that 
13  aristotle, 1962a, 70-71 (1103a25).
14  aquinas, 1920: 797-799 (Quaest. 50 art. 1). 
15  ibid., reply to 2. 
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the actor performs. Finally, habitus could reside in the body in a secondary 
manner, when it participates in the general habit ordered and directed by the 
soul. Therefore in the scholastic framework bodily habits are acknowledged, 
though they are submerged in the habits of the soul and are subordinate to 
them. in a second step, as we are going to see, aquinas raises the possibility 
of including material things in the kingdom of habit.     
in the opening of the discussion of habitus in the Summa Theologiæ, and 
following aristotle in the Categories, aquinas differentiates between habitus 
as “relation” and habitus as “having”, and it is the latter that aquinas links 
with physical usage. aquinas returns to the examples of the garment 
and its wearer given by aristotle in the metaphysics. aquinas sharpens 
and radicalizes aristotle’s suggestion by saying that habits are situations 
involving things, i.e., those things that “we have about ourselves”17. Therefore 
here habitus is designed not only as a relation but also as including the 
material thing itself, having an actual relation with a body and being 
carried by a body. habits are, therefore, inter alia, also bodily accessories 
which are found in a relation to a body, adorning and covering it: 
“Thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is 
adorned or covered [ornans vel tegens, et aliud ornatum aut tectum]: wherefore 
the Philosopher says (metaph. v, text. 25) that ‘a habit is said to be, as it 
were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had’; as is the 
case in those things which we have about ourselves [quae circa nos habemus]. 
and therefore these constitute a special genus of things [speciale genus 
rerum], which are comprised under the predicament of ‘habit’: of which the 
Philosopher says that ‘there is a habit between clothing and the man who is 
clothed’ [inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est habitus 
medius]”.
To conclude this all-too-brief account, in the scholastic version, habitus of 
the body should be understood as a quasi-habitus closer to a disposition 
(because its subject could be easily changed), which is directed to the form 
of the subject, that is to say, to the actualization of the natural form of the 
actor. corporeal habitus maintains the ambiguous status of the aristotelian 
hexis: on the one hand, it is contingent and artificial, but on the other hand 
it adheres and conforms to the form of its actor and is integrated in the 
actor’s operations. hence, aquinas maintains both the elements and the 
ambiguity of the Aristotelian definitions: He maintains the dispersal of hexis 
between the various categories (relation, quality and having), as well as 
17  aquinas, 1920: 793 (Quaest. 49, art 1, answer). 
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the distinction between habits, potencies and affects. yet aquinas enlarges 
the aristotelian model by adding to it this “speciale genus rerum”, the habit 
understood as a “res”. one has indeed to remember that in the romance 
languages, “habit” also denotes simply a cloth, a garment, dress and custom, 
this genre of things that cover the body and serve as its “second skin”. in 
as much as aquinas distinguished between the possessive-material kind 
of habitus and the properly moral one, in the 19th century the two parts of 
habitus re-unite to create the modern “habitude” in this later formulation of 
habit, the bodily possession of habit is considered not only as an element but 
as a constitutive part of the moral domain. 
in 1802, maine de Biran has located the notion of habitude as the center of his 
treatment of the human psyche and its faculty of thought (pensée), to which 
corporeal reality itself, according to Biran, is immanent18. a treatment of the 
peculiar immanence of the body in Biran and of the place of habitude in its 
construction will require a separate study19. yet it is important to note that Biran 
differentiates between passive and active habitudes: those habits which are “forced” 
on the organism from its surrounding, and those which are initiated or developed 
by the conscious organism itself. This Biranian differentiation, as we shall see, will 
be elaborated by Bergson. 
ravaisson’s de l’habitude of 1838 condenses several traditions of discussion of 
habit, of which the prominent ones are the aristotelian and the Biranian20. The 
scholastic model, on the other hand, is not explicitly named as a direct source for 
ravaisson’s inquiry. nevertheless, ravaisson’s attitude towards habitude shares 
notable affinities with that of Aquinas, affinities regarding the spiritual, theological 
horizon and beginning of habits. ravaisson opens his inquiry with the quote from 
aristotle mentioned above, “character comes after nature”21. hence the relation 
between habitude and nature is posed as the leitmotif of the essay. The second 
quote from aristotle ravaisson brings at the opening pages of his essay 
is a known sentence from the opening of the second book of the ethics22 
in which aristotle maintains that inanimate things could not acquire a 
virtue: “for not even if you throw a stone upwards ten thousand times will 
it ever rise upward unless under the operation of force23”. The aristotelian 
ethical framework of ravaisson’s discussion is therefore evident, and one 
18  de Biran, 1953.
19  For such an examination see henry, 1965: 71-105. 
20  Janicaud, 1997: 15-35. 
21  ravaisson, 2008: 24-25.     
22  aristotle, 1962a : 70-71 (1103a20).  
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of the central conceptual operations of ravaisson’s essay is the synthesis 
between ethics and physics, a synthesis extending between will and nature, 
a synthesis that, according to ravaisson, makes the work that habitude has to 
accomplish.      
differently from the Thomistic version which proceeds from the 
presentation of habitus to the discussion of moral virtue, ravaisson 
begins his essay with an extensive discussion of the physical world and the 
manner in which habitude participates in its construction. The discussion 
begins by questioning the place of habit in nature, in spatiotemporal 
reality, in material things and in bodies. From an aristotelian point of 
view this method is acceptable as in fact this order of discussion searches 
to understand habitus’ foundation in natural disposition (diathesis), 
conforming with the discussion in the Categories that was mentioned 
above, stating that habit begins as a disposition. also in agreement with 
aristotle, ravaisson’s conclusion is that in the inorganic domain, which is 
immediate and homogenous (according to ravaisson), habitude as such does 
not exist24. Therefore, habitude does not belong essentially to nature. instead, 
habitude begins where human action begins, that is to say, where an ethical 
organization (in the aristotelian sense) is enabled. even if the habitual 
dynamics are not natural, ravaisson demonstrates that the depths of the 
habitual architectonics come infinitesimally close to nature in its pure 
physical reality. habitude acts like a membrane prolonging the movement 
between the moral and the natural domains.  
ravaisson’s habitude is an instrument of prolongation. Two levels of 
prolongation characterize the ravaissonian habitude. First, as we have seen, 
like in aristotle (and in aquinas), the work of habitude needs an enduring 
process of acquisition and contraction (these are ravaisson’s terms). 
Secondly, habitude necessitates the existence of an element of a domain 
which is exterior to the active organism. in other words, a primary condition 
for the formation of a habitude is a situation of heterogeneity existing between 
a thinking-active body and its natural surroundings25. This fundamental 
heterogeneity is the reason for the fact that habituation is a process 
demanding a time-span, a duration, in order to gradually (and never fully) 
bridge-up this abyss between the soul and exterior nature. in the inorganic 
world, where cause and effect are established and immediate as the rules of 
nature, there is neither a need nor a place for a process of habituation. This 
24  ravaisson, 2008: 28-29.  
25  on heterogeneity in ravaisson see montebello, 2003: 82, 89, 91. 
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lapse of time characteristic of human reality and its habitudes, as we shall 
shortly see was captured and underlined by henri Bergson. moreover, for 
Bergson, the domain of habitude extends, in principle, also to the inorganic 
world, that is to say, to matter itself26.  
   
For ravaisson, with the help of habitude, liberty and consciousness could 
re-unite with the natural tendency for repetition and rehearsal, which is 
spontaneous and unconscious (otherwise referred to in physical terms as 
“inertia”). in order to describe the architectonics of habitude, ravaisson 
introduces the model of a spiral, which has its deep roots in the very 
beginning of organic life, whereas its upper bounds dwell in the light of 
consciousness. “habit comes back down this spiral, teaching us of its origin 
and genesis”27. This “spiral” movement of habitude is established only in 
the domain of organized life; but organization of life, as in aristotle and in 
aquinas, is always a result of the morphologies of the soul, and therefore: 
“It is in consciousness alone that we can find the archetype of habit; it is 
only in consciousness that we can aspire not just to establish its apparent 
law but to learn its how and its why, to illuminate its generation and, finally 
to understand its cause”28. yet when arriving to the pure formal level of 
the organization by the soul, one is no longer in the domain of nature: “as 
soon as the spiral arrives at self-consciousness, it is no longer merely the 
form, the end or even the principle of organization: a world opens within 
it that increasingly separates and detaches itself from the life of the body, 
and in which the soul has its own life, its own destiny and its own end to 
accomplish”29. godly grace and the Spirit’s freedom are transcendent both 
to nature and to the habitual domain. and both godly grace and the Spirit’s 
freedom are, according to ravaisson’s understanding, the beginning and 
principle (arché) of habitude. The beginning of habitude is generated by a 
gesture of grace enacted upon human reality from its outside. on this issue, 
ravaisson is closer to aquinas than to aristotle. as we are going to see, for 
Bergson, who also strolled down the paths of the aristotelian formulations, 
habitude is generated by nature and from within nature, and, in a certain 
sense, habitude is nature itself.   
Bergson radicalized the affiliation of habitude30 with corporeal reality and to 
nature itself. In this, as Bergson clarified in his course notes of 1892-1893, he 
26  “a vrai dire, la matière est susceptible d’habitudes”, Bergson, 1992: 272. 
27  ravaisson, 2008: 76-77. 
28  ravaisson, 2008: 38-39. 
29  ravaisson, 2008: 66-67.
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followed what he called “the naturalist thinkers of habitude31”. yet, Bergson’s 
explorations of habitude refer explicitly as well to the aristotelian and the 
ravaissonian sources. dominique Janicaud, an eminent researcher of the 
relation between ravaisson and Bergson, has determined that Bergson’s 
reading of ravaisson on the subject of habitude is an “optical error”32 that 
fails to serve as a true reflection of Ravaisson’s model. Bergson’s reading of 
ravaisson is erroneous, according to Janicaud, as the former emphasized the 
mechanical nature of habitude and even reduced habitude to a mechanical 
activity, whereas as for ravaisson habitude has an extra-natural, spiritual 
and godly source. The approach taken in the present paper, though, 
neither over-emphases the idealistic character of ravaisson’s work nor 
over-materializes the mechanical character of habitude in Bergson. Both 
Spiritualist thinkers pursued what Pierre montebello called “a movement 
towards profundity” [le movement vers la profondeur]33. and for both ravaisson 
and Bergson, it is habitude which opens the door to the descent inwards, 
though by two different methods. 
Both versions of habitude, adhering to the Spiritualist decree34, reserve for it 
the privileged status of serving as a starting platform of philosophical inquiries. 
moreover Bergson returned to an issue which was addressed by de Biran 
but was not prominent in ravaisson’s model, which is the relation between 
habitude and memory35. much more than an optical error, this observation 
by Bergson in fact drew a reasonably poignant conclusion from ravaisson’s 
habitual spiral, and bounded ravaisson’s discussion more strongly with its 
Biranian, and therefore Spiritualist, roots.     
it is true though that for Bergson all habitudes are essentially motoric. in 
numerous places in his writings, the word “habitude” appears together with 
the word “motrice”, creating the expression of “motoric habitude”. habitude 
is therefore connected in Bergson’s thought to the movements of the 
organism. This is how Bergson presents ravaisson’s concept of habitude, in 
an honorary essay from 1904:
For motor habit [une habitude motrice], once contracted, is a 
mechanism, a series of movements which determine one another: it 
is that part of us which is inserted into nature and which coincides 
31  Bergson, 1992: 265-273. 
32  Janicaud, 1997: 50.
33  montebello, 2003: 97.
34  Janicaud, 1997: 126-161. 
35  Biran, 1953: 130-163.
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with nature; it is nature itself. now, our inner experience shows us in 
habit an activity which has passed, by imperceptible degrees, from 
consciousness to unconsciousness and from will to automatism. 
Should we not then imagine nature, in this form, as an obscured 
consciousness and a dormant will? habit thus gives us the living 
demonstration of this truth, that mechanism is not sufficient to itself: 
it is, so to speak, only the fossilized residue of a spiritual activity36.  
Bergson’s version of the concept of habitude is indeed different from that 
of ravaisson. For Bergson, habitude is immanent to the mechanical nature 
of practical life. motoric habitude, Bergson emphasizes, has its cause not 
so much in the spirit but rather in the utility of the organism. habitude 
guaranties that the same gesture would be ready to respond to future 
situations belonging to the same genre37. Thus, habitude engenders and 
installs in the body a motoric apparatus38, whose own effect, Bergson 
clarifies, is either to construe the automatic machinery in the organism, or 
to produce a need in the organism39. as in all conceptions of habit discussed 
in this essay thus far, so also for Bergson the acquisition (“contraction”) of 
a habitude is achieved through repetition and rehearsal. The rehearsal of 
gestures by habituation orders and organizes the activity of the organism.40 
moreover, for Bergson, this establishing and ordering of gestures is of a 
mnemonic kind41. every gesture which is performed by motoric habitudes 
realizes a virtual reservoir of movements, perceptions and memories, 
already performed by the organism as a reaction to a similar movement, 
cause, or image42. we note in passim that this still stands in agreement 
with the aristotelian determination of hexis as a capacity to react to the 
affections. 
Therefore, according to this Bergsonian understanding, from any rehearsed 
gesture of the body one could draw enormous amount of data regarding the 
history of the organism. The habitual spiral of ravaisson mentioned above, 
therefore, was brought by Bergson to a radical conceptual consequence, in 
Bergson’s view that the roots of habit lie not only deep in the body but also 
in the very past of the organism.  
36  Bergson, 1946: 275; Bergson, 2009: 267.
37  Bergson, 2012: 186. 
38  Bergson, 2012: 267.
39  Bergson, 1992: 266. 
40  Bergson, 2012: 88-89. 
41  Bergson, 1992: 270. 
42  Bergson, 2009: 182.  
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The decisive character making Bergson’s habitude a concept in its own right 
is its relation with memory. This aspect of the relation between habitude and 
memory is not to be found in the ravaissonian version, but is rather to be 
found earlier, in de Biran43. Bergson understood the core-activity of memory 
as operated by motoric habitudes. For Bergson, motoric habitudes are memory 
in its mechanic, automatic, un-reflective aspect, taking place in the body as 
well as in in the soul.
 
in the operation of habitudes, the actor constantly re-enacts, re-realizes 
its past deeds, willingly or unwillingly, consciously or unconsciously. For 
Bergson, this not only includes a physical aspect but is the physical aspect 
of the organism. The body is a lump of conglomerated, better or worse 
organized habitudes, and the part of the soul directing mental or corporeal 
habitudes is already conceived as spatial in its very nature, and therefore 
belonging to material reality, not to  spirit’s domain. yet the memory of 
the body, constituted by the ensemble of the sensorial-motoric system that 
habitude has organized44, condenses the entire past of the organism into 
momentary actions, which can be transfigured into moments of intuition. 
Bergsonian intuition therefore should be considered as working along with 
and within the architecture of habitudes, rather than as a transgression 
beyond them altogether. Bergsonian intuition, understood literally, should 
be conceived as a grasping of the manner in which an intensive-compressed 
network of habits and memories are realized in a certain momentary act 
of a particular apprehension (of an idea, of an object etc.): “in concrete 
perception memory intervenes, and the subjectivity of sensible qualities 
is due precisely to the fact that our consciousness, which begins by being 
only memory, prolongs a plurality of moments into each other, contracting 
them into a single intuition45”. intuition, in this sense, is a configuration of 
habitudes. furthermore a pure intuition, the productive intuition that one finds 
in philosophy and art, is enacted as the un-making (défaire) of habitudes, in 
order to “recover contact with the real”46. Bergsonian intuition therefore 
is a two-layered mental act (literal and pure), and both layers involve the 
working with habitudes: At the literal level, intuition configures a reservoir 
of habitudes into a point of contact with reality; and at its pure level, 
intuition un-makes this virtual reservoir in order to restore something that 
was missed or contorted in the literal moment of apprehension. 
   
43  Biran, 1953: 117-145.
44  Bergson, 2012: 169. 
45  Bergson, 1911: 292; Bergson, 2012: 246.  
46  Bergson, 1911: 241; Bergson, 2012: 205. 
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Therefore we learn that habitude has the capacity to register knowledge of 
the history of the habituated organism in an orderly and extended manner, 
partes extra partes. This capacity of habitude has also its pedagogical aspect:
The memory of the lesson, which is remembered in the sense of learnt 
by heart, has all the marks of a habit. like a habit, it is acquired by the 
repetition of the same effort. Like a habit, it demands first a decomposition 
and then a re-composition of the whole action. lastly, like every habitual 
bodily exercise, it is stored up [emmagasiné] in a mechanism which is set 
in motion as a whole by an initial impulse, in a closed system of automatic 
movement which succeed each other in the same order and, together, take 
the same length of time47.
Therefore, learning by heart, appropriating a poem, a language, a style, 
being acquainted and truly familiar with some object, embodies the core 
structure of habitude.
habitude is acquired by the repetition of effort; but when effort is repeated 
automatically, it tends to diminish and to evaporate. yet repetition itself 
holds the capacity to de-compose a movement and to re-compose it again. 
and this, according to Bergson, is already a supplementary effort which 
keeps habitudes alert and intelligent48. Therefore habitual repetition holds 
the capacity to become innovative when it involves the de-composition of 
gestures, actions and deeds. without repetition and rehearsal one could 
neither begin nor continue to perform the task of understanding a poem. 
yet the habitual activity, for example like of literature reading or wine-
tasting, is being enhanced by attention and effort, thereby producing an 
ever-growing subtlety, that is to say, taste49.
The motoric gestures of the body, by their rehearsal, create a mechanical 
habitude and establish the movements that automatically follow certain 
perceptions. This is the basis of the survival of the organism in its adaptation 
to its milieu. This process registers the past of the organism in the figures of 
its habitudes50: “The body retains motor habits capable of acting the past over 
again [ jouer à nouveau le passé]; it can resume attitudes in which the past will 
insert itself; or, again, by the repetition of certain cerebral phenomena which 
have prolonged former perception, it can furnish to remembrance a point 
47  Bergson, 1911: 89-90; Bergson, 2012: 84.  
48  Bergson, 2012: 122.
49  Bergson, 1992: 244. 
50  Bergson, 2012: 89. 
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of attachment [point d’attache] with the actual, a means of recovering its lost 
influence upon present reality”51. 
in our view, then, Bergson’s reading of ravaisson’s habitude distinguished 
an important aspect of habitude which was latent in ravaisson’s account. 
moreover, we suggest that one should assign to habitude a decisive place in 
Bergson’s philosophy at large, a more important place indeed than the one 
which is usually admitted. Bergsonian habitude is not only a reservoir of 
the past of the organism; it also constitutes the primary subject-matter of 
philosophical inquiry.  
according to Bergson, habitudes of all kinds (material, mental and intellectual) 
divert our spirit from capturing reality, as they construe an architecture of 
assumed relations between situations and actions. yet the reversibility of 
habitudes, that is, the fact that they are not natural, but rather constituted and 
artificial (again in full conformity with the Aristotelian formulation), makes 
habitudes capable of being disintegrated, so that a momentary contact with 
reality would be enabled: “intelligence has contracted habits necessary for 
everyday living; these habits, transferred to the domain of speculation, bring 
us face to face with a reality, distorted or made over, or at any rate, arranged; 
but the arrangement does not force itself upon us irresistibly; it comes from 
ourselves; what we have done we can undo; and we enter then into direct 
contact with reality52”. habitudes are formed by the practical necessities of man 
and it is the task of metaphysics, according to Bergson, to begin its inquiries 
by dissipating and questioning those habitudes, the artificial obscurities that 
diverted mind’s connection with reality53. in other words, Bergson assigns to 
philosophy the task of (re-)beginning by a deconstruction of the synthetic 
reality, in which utility constructs motoric habit. This habitual reality should 
be referred to as a moral reality in the aristotelian sense of being occupied with 
the managing of human actions, gestures and deeds. any metaphysical inquiry 
should begin by a questioning of the habitual domain of human reality which is 
simultaneously moral and physical, beginning by examining the philosopher’s 
own mental-habits, decomposing them and recomposing them anew. returning 
to the aristotelian vocabulary, we’d say that Philosophy, according to Bergson, 
should begin with a naturalized reality, with the extended habit that has been 
established in somesubject who is under consideration. The inquiry then should 
proceed by dismantling, undressing, deconstructing, going down the spiral of 
habit and denaturalizing it in order to uncover its beginning, its arché, which is, in 
51  Bergson, 1911: 299; Bergson, 2012: 253. 
52  Bergson, 1946: 30-31; Bergson, 2009: 22.
53  Bergson, 2012: 9.  
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all versions that we have examined (aristotle, aquinas, ravaisson and Bergson), 
an affect arriving to the subject from an outside (nature, movement, godly 
grace, necessity, etc.). This kind of metaphysical questioning will neither be 
“materialist” nor “idealist”, but it would be at any rate an incorporated process 
of inquiry, in which thought would have to pierce through its own incorporated, 
inhabited habits, in order to achieve moments of contact with nature.   
could one think of the 19th century French chapter of dealing with habitude 
of the body as a response to the aristotelian and Thomistic challenges and 
ambiguities? in the Spiritualist version suggested by ravaisson and Bergson, 
habitude is not anymore a quality laid upon the surface of the organism: rather 
it is a reality installing the interior and the depth of the organism itself, up 
until the point of the lodge of the spirit, the latter remaining always free and 
self-constituting. habit in this version is seen more as prosthesis rather than 
as ornament, it is an ornament becoming prosthesis, being anchored in the 
organisms’ reality. 
The two most crucial questions arising out of this state of affairs are (a) what 
could be the conceptual consequences of the late 19th century mixture between 
habitude and corporeality to the understanding of spatiality and extension 
in general; and (b) returning to the aristotelian and Thomistic formulations, 
locating hexis and habitus between an actor and the habits that wrap it, one 
should ask what could be the consequences of ravaisson’s and Bergson’s 
elaborations of habitude not only for the actor-subject, but rather for the cloth 
itself, that is to say for the accessories accompanying the bodily actor. in the last 
couple of decades, within the framework of what is known as the Speculative-
realist turn, one finds a tendency to talk about an “object oriented ontology”, 
aiming to put in the center of philosophy not the human subject but rather the 
things and instruments surrounding it.54 here, on the other hand is suggested 
an equally realist manner of approaching the accessories and the habits of the 
human body as naturalizing instruments, while nevertheless maintaining 
the primacy of the subject: habits participate in the subject, they generate and 
re-generate it, covering the actor and simultaneously endowing the actor with 
profundity. The subject, embracing both the human actor and its habits, must 
be conceived as a moral, acting reality55, in which the rehearsal, realization 
and actualization of past actions literally produce the body, consisting of 
accessories, covers, containers, and the locks that hold all these together. 
Denaturalizing habits meaning finding the keys to unlock these various 
habitual cases, yet not doing away with habit altogether.
54  harman, 2010: 93-104. 
55  Badiou, 1982. 
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